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TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
FOUO No. 630

AFRICA

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SWEDISH AID TO, INTEREST IN AFRICA REPORTED

Discreet and Effective Aid

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Mar 79 pp 54-56

[Article by S.B.]

[Text] "To aid in the liberation of peoples and the struggle against poverty--these are the two great principles of Swedish development assistance," Ernest Michanek, director of the Swedish Office for International Development Aid (SIDA), told us in January. This militant formula may come as a surprise. In any case, it bears witness to Sweden's commitment to the side of the Third World. The figures are equally telling: devoting 1 percent of its gross national product to development aid, Sweden is in the first rank of countries rated by the Development Aid Committee of the OECD. It should be recalled that this is one of the few countries that exceed the .7 percent considered a minimum by the UN.

In contrast to the large donor countries, Sweden has neither a colonial past nor strategic interests or vital economic interests in the Third World. However, for 20 years development aid has been one of the major focuses of its foreign policy. The Swedish Social Democrat Party very early came out for independence for the colonized countries and showed it by raising its voice in international arenas or contributing diplomatic and financial support to the liberation movements. From the war in Algeria to the war in Vietnam, Swedish leaders did not miss an opportunity to support the nationalists, risking in the second case a profound crisis with the United States. From then on it became logical, once the countries were independent, for Sweden to come to their aid in their development effort. That was all the more easy because public opinion was already sensitized by the numerous militant secular and religious organizations toward decolonization and a solidarity extended to all the countries of the globe. Thus, the aid granted over many years to the PAIGC [African Independent Party of Guinea and Cape Verde], the FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front] and the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] was transformed into cooperation in the development of the new states. And the assistance--strictly humanitarian (food aid, medicines, clothing for refugees, training of cadres, financing of the defense of certain

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accused persons, etc.)--to the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, to the ANC [African National Congress] in South Africa and to the SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] in Namibia remains important; it went up from 85,000,000 kronor in budgetary year 1978-1979 to 120,000,000 for 1979-1980.

As for bilateral development aid under the jurisdiction of SIDA, which was created in 1965 to respond to the new needs of the Third World countries, it is supported by several basic principles intended to increase its effectiveness. The first consists of not spreading financial assistance over all the countries considered the poorest, but concentrating it on a small number for which it has real impact. Swedish leaders attach great importance to the use which is made of this assistance; it involves not only promoting growth, but also seeing to it that the fruits of development are better distributed. For this reason the Swedes are especially interested in the sectors of health, education and rural development.

Assistance to industry, however, continues to have priority in financing (over 30 percent). Next come agriculture and water and energy supply (12 percent each), education (8 percent), transportation (6 percent), health and food (5 percent).

With constant concern for effectiveness, the bilateral assistance programs are studied for the long term in cooperation with the authorities of the assisted country. Geographic concentration and long-term planning seem to them to be two conditions essential for attracting the best part of an aid that is still relatively modest in absolute value.

Public development aid will increase this year (budgetary fiscal year 1979-1980) to 4,370,000 kronor, as compared with 3,800,000 in 1977-1978. Of this amount 1,416,000, or nearly a third of the total, will be devoted to multilateral aid, which remains important, despite a relative decline during the last decade. "After the war," Mr Michanek explains, "we supported the United Nations and their technical and financial assistance programs; in that way gave multilateral assistance a large place. Gradually we felt the need to set up bilateral cooperation."

Bilateral aid represents two thirds of total aid, and the 2,863,000 kronor affected by this expedient will be distributed to the 20 "continuous cooperation" countries in which SIDA is financing long-term programs. Ninety-seven percent of this aid is granted in the form of gifts. Also, in 1978 Sweden canceled the debts of the poorest countries. Only a few countries that are considered less deprived--Cuba, Tunisia and Zambia--are receiving part of the aid in the form of loans. Finally, another advantage: less than 15 percent of Swedish aid is binding and that percentage is decreasing (650,000,000 kronor in 1979-1980, as compared with 675,000,000 in 1978-1979).

Asia heads the list of recipients of this bounty. Vietnam is far in the forefront with 400,000,000 kronor this year, followed by India (290,000,000). Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are also in the roster of Asiatic beneficiaries.

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extremely well placed. Some countries are assuming increasing importance in Sweden's general cooperation policy. Several exceptions aside--Tunisia and Guinea-Bissau in particular--the totality of the beneficiary countries is located in Eastern and Southern Africa. Sweden is concretely expressing its condemnation of South Africa's minority regimes by giving priority to the five Front Line countries (Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Angola) which together expect to be granted this 720,000,000 kronor, or almost 25 percent of the total bilateral aid. As for East Africa, its ties with Sweden are facilitated by their common use of English and a certain "Anglo-Saxon familiarity." This is not the case for French-speaking western and central Africa, where Swedes are conspicuous for their absence. But aside from the language obstacle, which is not really an obstacle (the example of Tunisia proves that), the deputy director of SIDA told us that the French presence was too solidly implanted in that part of the continent for Sweden to find any valid reason to send part of its public finances there. But this is a region in which Swedish business men are beginning to be very much interested.

Tanzania, with 310,000,000 kronor in 1978-1979 and 345,000,000 in 1979-1980, is receiving about 12 percent of the Swedish bilateral development aid. It is the first African beneficiary of Swedish assistance. A new agreement is to be signed this year between the two countries which will furnish aid at over 1,000,000,000 kronor for the next three years. A single figure will suffice to measure its importance for Tanzania: in 1979 Swedish financing represents 10 percent of its total development budget. So the Tanzanians have nothing to complain about in the change of governmental team in Stockholm. However, they are saying that, learning of the defeat of his friend Olof Palme in 1976, President Nyerere immediately asked him, "What can I do to help you?" The major part of the financing is concentrated in the industrial sector and Swedish PME [Small and Medium-Sized Businesses] are strongly encouraged to invest in the country and to develop "joint ventures" with Tanzanian partners. Sweden is also participating in the financing of several large projects, such as setting up a pulp industry in which it is associated with the World Bank and the Kuwaiti Fund. Therefore, the Swedish private sector can only be pleased with a policy that benefits the whole economy as well. Swedish exports increased to 170,000,000 kronor in 1978, or twice the 1977 figure, and the trade balance shows an extreme deficit for Tanzania, which scarcely sells anything other than coffee to Sweden.

For Tunisia, this is the end of aid and the beginning of cooperation. The kickoff of Swedish assistance to Tunisia dates from the trip to Stockholm of President Bourguiba in 1962. Since that date Tunisia has received 400,000,000 French francs (20,000,000,000 CFA francs) from Sweden, two thirds of it in the form of gifts and one third in the form of loans, intended in large part for agriculture and professional training. The volume of this aid has recently declined, going to 30,000,000 kronor in 1978-1979, as compared with 40,000,000 per year in the preceding years. This is because Tunisia is no longer a part of the poorest countries, according to the United Nations criteria. After 1981 Swedish financial assistance will stop completely. However, that does not mean the end of bilateral relations, quite the contrary.

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Like Cuba, which is in a similar situation, Tunisia is going to serve as an experimental field for what the SIDA calls "expanded cooperation", ruling out traditional aid.

After having benevolently aided certain countries in emerging from poverty and putting in place an infrastructure favorable to a development speedup, the Swedes believe it legitimate to transform assistance into trade to the profit of both parties. Thus, for example, a seminar is to be given in March 1979 in Tunis, with the participation of Swedish and Tunisian firms, to encourage the forming of "joint ventures" in all fields. The LM Eriksson Company is already interested in the Tunisian market, as well as other Swedish firms. Swedish investments and the cooperation between the private sectors of both countries have therefore been called upon to develop, especially after 1981. But Tunisia's trade deficit with Sweden (60,000,000 kronor) is in danger of being an obstacle to the development of this kind of relations. The some 40,000 Swedish tourists who spend their vacations in Tunisia every year are not enough to restore the balance.

Finally, the third example--Mozambique. Swedish aid ranks at the top: 115,000,000 kronor in 1978-1979, 140,000,000 anticipated for 1979-1980, over 20,000,000 destined for refugees from Rhodesia and for the victims of the floods that ravaged several regions of the country. Moreover, Sweden is participating in Mozambique's agricultural development within the framework of a common program of the Nordic countries, with Denmark, Norway and Iceland. The total amount of this program, spread out over 13 years, is 50,000,000 kronor; at the present time about 30 projects are in the process of being carried out.

Within the framework of its assistance Sweden is furnishing aid for food imports (on which Mozambique is very dependent) as well as importation of social equipment (trucks, sanitary equipment, school equipment, etc.). Simultaneously with SIDA's activity, young Swedish volunteers belonging to groups having solidarity with the FRELIMO, which were formed at the time of the war of liberation, are continuing to contribute support in the sectors of health and education.

Important by virtue of its volume, the principles that sustain it and a discretion to which the Third World countries are not very much accustomed, Swedish aid is appreciated by its African partners. Having reached a level that is already remarkable, it will probably not be able to increase much over the next few years. The critical phase the Swedish economy is going through is forcing the leaders to worry more about domestic problems, since the troubles seem to be provoking in one part of public opinion a certain tendency to "Carticism." (See the interview with Mr Blix, minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, p 43). According to Mr Michanek, Swedish aid has not reached its maximum, but it has arrived at a plateau: "The totality of our aid is at present made up of gifts, or in some cases of credits, given under conditions set by the IDA [International Development Association] (a World Bank group that lends to the poorest countries). We can envisage other forms of cooperation based on the idea of reciprocal interest, following the one-way flow."

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Another idea that is thriving is the creation of international funds to aid the more deprived countries, in which Sweden might actively participate within a framework that would be different from traditional assistance."

Realism seems to be the order of the day. No one in interested circles is unaware that the Third World countries are potential markets for Swedish products, investments and technology. Encouragement to invest in Africa, promotion of articles "made in Sweden," trucks going to newly-occupied factories show that spirit. The leaders make no secret of it, emphasizing that a healthy cooperation should benefit all the partners and that the poverty in the Third World does not pay off over the long term. When we asked what was Sweden's interest in aiding the developing countries, the SIDA director answered, "Our main motivation has been and is the principle of solidarity. Sweden has an interest in having solidarity proven. Our high standard of living is in large part due to the importance of our exports; that means our trade relations are vital to us. So we must make every effort to develop our international relations in all areas. Moreover, it is not in the interest of any nation to maintain the gap that currently exists between rich and poor. Our objective can be summed up like this: peace and development for all, which requires a radical change in the present situation of the least developed countries. Independence must precede interdependence, and both parties can only gain in these new relations. You can call this attitude whatever you like, but it is quite simply "realpolitik."


It is not always easy to reconcile the imperatives of "realpolitik" and the ideals of justice and humanism. The question of Swedish investments in South Africa has long been an example of this. Although declining, the trade is not negligible: Swedish exports to South Africa increased to 356,000,000 kronor in 1977 (-15 percent in relation to 1976). Numerous Swedish companies also have interests and some of them have subsidiaries in South Africa. Such contradictions to the government's stubbornly anti-apartheid policy are in danger of raising problems in time. So Sweden has had to choose, and the choice was made in favor of its African partners. Although not all trade relations have been abolished, a law has been adopted by Parliament (by a large majority) forbidding Swedish firms to carry out new investments in South Africa, either directly or through their foreign subsidiaries.

Reactions in management circles to the filing of the draft law have not been unanimous; some industrialists deplore the decision, affirming that Sweden can do nothing but surrender its position to less scrupulous Western competitors. Others, on the other hand, are satisfied with a measure that puts all the Swedish firms on the same level and they realize that the choice was inevitable. Sweden is the first Western country to make such a decision.

However, in another sector Sweden's trade imperatives do not always coincide with her foreign policy. Although she condemns with finality the authoritarian regimes of South America, a country like Chile absorbed 9 percent of her total armament sales in 1978. After all, no one is perfect, as is well known to the Swedish leaders who do not pose as models, but who are trying to make the most likely of sometimes contradictory necessities coincide.

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Even while managing its interests as an industrial country, Sweden is causing a sometimes discordant voice to be heard in the OECD, in defense of the principle of an evolution toward less unequal relations with the Third World.



Key:

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| 1. Development aid granted by SIDA to Cooperation Countries Continues. 1977/1978 allocations in millions of Swedish kronor | 8. Cape Verde 20 |
| 2. Construction 73 | 9. Tunisia 40 |
| 3. Humanitarian aid 100 | 10. Ethiopia 70 |
| 4. Trade and financial activities 13 | 11. Zambia 80 |
| 5. Public management and other services 16 | 12. India 240 |
| 6. Aid to imports in no special sector 109 | 13. Tanzania 13 |
| 7. Various 83 | |

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Swedish Industry Interested

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Mar 79 pp 58, 60

[Article by S.B.]

[Text] Although the Swedish economy is wide open to the outside, 80 percent of its trade is conducted with industrial capitalist countries and only 13 percent with non-oil-producing Third World countries. A little over 6 percent of its total imports come directly from OPEC countries. As for Africa, it absorbs less than 5 percent of the Swedish exports and competes for 2.5 percent of its imports. Six African countries (Liberia, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Angola) are part of the top 50 export markets for Sweden, and four (Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Kenya) are among its 50 principal suppliers.

However, the modesty of this trade flow should not hide the dynamism of the Swedish firms, some of which have already long occupied a choice place among the many Third World countries. The administration encourages industrialists and business men to actively prospect these "markets of the future." The development aid policy makes things easier for them, insofar as the quality of this assistance gives Sweden an extremely useful image in the eyes of aspiring investors.

Thus, Swedish exports to Africa more than tripled between 1970 and 1977, rising from 1,261,000 to 3,852,000 kronor, while in 1977 the imports from African countries did not exceed 2,037,000 kronor. Moreover, many Swedish firms have been established in Africa for a more or less long time. They are participating increasingly frequently in the development of industrial projects, such as the exploitation of iron ore in Liberia through the Lamco Company. In the paper and pulp sector, in which Sweden naturally occupies a top position, Swedish firms are the payees for several African firms, in particular the Gabonese Cellulose Company and Cellulose of Morocco. They are also participating in the development of the paper pulp plant at Edea in Cameroon and a project of the same type is soon to see the light of day in Tanzania.

In the automobile industry, Volvo several years installed an assembly line in Morocco, and Scania recently concluded an agreement with a Moroccan firm for local assembling of the bodies of trucks and cars; a new plant is to begin production in Casablanca during the second half of 1979. Volvo also has a truck assembly line in Kenya and is in negotiations with Mozambique for a similar development. Moreover, the top Swedish firm conducts a very active trade policy toward Africa.

The products of Swedish engineering and project development are also present on the continent. In the agro-food sector, the Alfa Laval group, through the agency of the mother company and several of its powerful subsidiaries (including Alfa Laval France) has carved out a choice place in Africa by installing a number of dairy-cattle-raising complexes. Seven dairy farms and cheese farms were established in Algeria between 1972 and 1977; developments

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are also under way in Nigeria and Mozambique; and the group recent extended its activities to other sections, building brewery in Tunis and fruit juice plants in the Ivory Coast. Atlas Copco is selling drilling equipment in a number of countries, Algeria and Nigeria being among its principal export markets.

Apart from the Swedish Export Office, whose promotional role is important, several paragonovernmental organizations have been created in recent years to reinforce economic relations with the African countries. The most recently established is the Swedfund, which has been operating since early this year. Entirely financed by the state, its task is to encourage small and medium-sized Swedish firms in the processing industry to invest in the Third World, particularly in Africa, where 80 percent of the projects under discussion are located. Closely connected with the SIDA, in whose shadow it operates, it seems to want to concentrate its activities in countries favored with state assistance; thus, thus, a plant for assembling vans will soon see the light of day in Tanzania. Another state-financed organization, Impod, is proposing to open the Swedish market to Third World products and has undertaken promotional activities with that in mind.

Swedish liberalism with respect to the Third World, however, has limits, and imports of textile products from the Far East are already under a quota system. Unions, in the name of protecting employment, are waging a campaign against creating industrial free zones in a number of developing countries that are in danger, they affirm, of competing with Swedish products on the domestic market. For the moment Sweden is showing plenty of surplus in its trade with the Third World, except for hydrocarbons. Despite several good will gestures, its offensive policy is in danger of maintaining this imbalance for some time to come.

Famous Research Institutions

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Mar 79 p 58

[Text] Uppsala, which is one of Sweden's oldest cities, has sheltered a university of renown since the Middle Ages. The seat of many missions, it has an Africanist tradition two centuries old. It is in this setting of rather outmoded charm that several organizations for research on Africa and the problems of development have been established.

The Scandinavian Institute for African Studies, created in 1962, is one of the best known. Financed conjointly by Sweden, Denmark and Norway, it specializes in research in the social sciences and employs in those most diversified subjects multidisciplinary teams of specialists. Its task is also to inform a public that is often not very well informed about what is happening on the continent. Its library on Africa is one of the best in Europe.

Southern Africa and the French-speaking countries are at present the regions that arouse the most interest among researchers. Arranging many seminars and publishing works, studies or reports of colloquies of Scandinavian, African or other kinds of specialists have bestowed upon the Institute incontestable authority in many fields.

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Not far from the Institute another organization bears the name of one of the Swedes best known in Africa: it is the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, which was founded in 1962 to honor the memory of the secretary general of the United Nations. Arranging seminars and publications on all problems having reference to development are the tasks set for it. A biennial journal in English, DEVELOPMENT AND DIALOG, completes its activities. The Foundation is chiefly distinguished by the publication of numerous works on the new international economic order and the North-South dialog. Questions connected with transfer of technology are claiming its attention today.

These organizations, whose independence of spirit is remarkable, illustrate the wealth and the openness of Swedish research for the developing world, as does SAREC [expansion unknown] for its part in Stockholm; in a way it is an extension of SIDA's level of thought. Today it seems to be hard to undertake a serious study on Africa without finding out what is going on in Sweden, however far away it may be.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

DIAMANG ACTIVITIES REVIEWED--The report of the General Company of Belgium for 1978 includes, in the chapter devoted to its diamond subsidiaries, the activities of the Diamond Company of Angola (DIAMANG) in which the previously named Belgian company holds 200,300 shares worth 500 kwanzas each, or 11.57 percent of the capital. The Angola Diamond Company mines diamonds on concessions having an area of 50,000 square kilometers in the northeastern region of the country. The massive exodus of Portuguese workers and technicians employed in the company's mines and administrative departments and the damage suffered by the fleet of vehicles and mining equipment were the main causes of a very considerable drop in production in 1976 and 1977. Aid from the Angolan authorities and efforts made by foreign technicians made available to the company by its principle private shareholders did make it possible to bring about a degree of rectification of the situation in 1978. Over 700,000 carats of diamonds for jewelry were mined. Private English and Belgian shareholders also provided financial aid in the form of a loan for the resumption of DIAMANG's activities. No progress has been made in the establishment of terms of indemnification of shareholders who lost their holdings by the Angolan decree of 24 August 1977. Nevertheless, by virtue of Portuguese legal provisions, the distribution to shareholders of assets belonging to the company and sequestered in Portugal is anticipated. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Mar 79 p 711] 11,464

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CAMEROON

DECREE ESTABLISHES FOREIGN TRADE CENTER

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Mar 79 p 697

[Text] On 8 March, President Ahidjo signed an order concerning the establishment and organization of a National Foreign Trade Center (CNCE) with its main office in Douala. It will open offices inside the country and abroad depending on need.

It will be the task of the organization to: systematically seek out foreign markets; join with the proper public administrations and professional organizations involved in studying ways of using these markets; and propose measures tending to promote commercial trade between Cameroon and other countries.

In addition, the CNCE will be in charge of providing economic, commercial and technical information and regulation requirements in the field of foreign trade for producers, merchants and national or foreign professional organizations. It is to gather opinions of professionals on foreign trade and transmit them to the government, recommending that the government make the necessary adaptations in regulations in order to meet requirements for the exporting of national products. Finally, it is to do everything possible in order to improve imports and exports with respect to the various related departments of foreign trade operations.

The CNCE's board of directors is made up of a chairman and eleven members: a representative from the departments of the prime minister; a representative of the minister of economy and planning; a representative of the minister of finance; a representative of the minister of agriculture; a representative of the general delegate for tourism; the general director of the National Office for the Marketing of Basic Products or his representative; the president of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Mining of Cameroon; the president of the Chamber of Agriculture, Livestock Raising and Forests; the president of the National Union of Lumbering Operators; the president of the National Union of Manufacturers; and the president of the National Union of Importers and Exporters.

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CAMEROON

BRIEFS

NEW SHIPS ORDERED--A bulletin published in Yaounde on 8 March by the Cameroon Shipping Lines (CAMSHIPLINES) has just announced that that shipping company has ordered two new multipurpose ships, each having a dead-weight capacity of 16,000 tons. The two vessels will be delivered to the company at the end of the year. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Mar '79 p 697] 11,464

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CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

BOKASSA SECURE FOR MOMENT WITH FRENCH AID

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Mar 79, pp 71, 72

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "'God, Money and I, Your Papa'"]

[Text] To relieve the torpor of the 200 passengers aboard the Air Afrique DC-8, a hostess announces the approach to Bangui with this warning: "We urgently recommend that you do not take with you on debarking the enchained newspapers JEUNE AFRICA, AFRICASIA (sic) and LE CANARD."

At the airport of the Central African capital, the search is much more meticulous on arrival--for those attempting to bring in the newspapers--than on departure--for those hiding some diamonds in their luggage.

This obsession is explained by the fact that these passengers are arriving at Bangui several weeks after the serious outbreaks that roughly shook the Central African Empire on 20 and 21 January, leaving a balance sheet of about 400 dead.

Contrary to what has been said or written, Bokassa is still solidly tuned into a land that he knows well, that he controls better than is believed, and he still has the benefit of significant foreign support, principally from France. But the incidents of January have left traces, beginning with the road leading from the airport to the capital. A large billboard, "Bangui the Stylish, the City of Betting", partially destroyed, sets the tone. Yet, for all that, Bangui remains a really pretty city, clean, neat and welcoming, an agreeable place to live in peacetime. This is not yet the case. Soldiers, submachine-guns in hand, mount guard in front of the ministries, certain administrations, the radio, and even in front of the three statues of Bokassa (a fourth, imperial one is being finished). But the strictest vigilance is shown in front of the store, "Le Pacific," owned by the Empress Catherine, the official wife of Bokassa I. If one believes the taxi-drivers' stories, nearly the whole city belongs to "Papa the Emperor." There is truth and legend in it. In recent weeks Bokassa has even taken measures to relax the atmosphere by "denationalizing" some firms. That implies that he has released some ballast on some of his own companies. His magnanimity has gone so far as to restore the "union freedom" with the creation of wage commissions to study the demands after most of the active population went on strike. To protest, both the repression that

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came down on the high-school students and the decline in the purchasing power of wage-earners--when the salaries are paid, which is not always the case. The discontent was such that even a part of the cotton harvest belonging to the UCCA (Central African Cotton Union) was burned by the peasants. The anger extended to the women, who went out into the streets in a silent march.

Some throw away their medals, rewarding wives who have given birth to four or more children. This deterioration in the situation worries the 4,000 Europeans who live in Bangui but who have the utmost difficulty in uprooting themselves from their way of life, the privileges, their advantages.

What is left of the incidents of 20 and 21 January? The numerous slogans written on the walls by students, denouncing the corruption and demanding the return of the Republic are covered by posters of the "Renewed MESAN [Movement for the Social Development of Black Africa]", the single party, singing the glory of Bokassa I and "his fierce fight to open up the country." Traces of pillage can still be seen in several dozen stores, especially those of the Lebanese. On the other hand, the large "Peasant" store belonging to Bokassa was quickly put back into operating condition.

Bokassa, having felt the rise of discontent, quickly had it channeled in the direction of the "pillars of the Central African economy, the Lebanese, the Yemenites and the Haoussa Cameroonians or Nigerians." However, everyone knows these are just the small fry. But even those who did not escape the hunt and the looting were called in on 31 January to pay immediately all taxes and assessments owing to the state, with advance payments to the end of 1980.

In fact, the most serious problem being raised in the Empire is the state's empty coffers, all the more so since Bokassa has made money one of the sacrosanct mainstays of the state by stating in 1976, "What counts for the most in life are God, money and I, your papa." It is money that has dried up the fastest because of the large acts of folly (8,000,000,000 CFA francs) connected with the coronation in December 1977, and the lifestyle of the emperor's court, with its enormous complex at Berengo, and that of the Empress Catherine at Bangui.

In the hottest hours of the January outbreaks, Bokassa was really afraid and had evacuated in hermetically sealed caskets all the coronation "gifts", worth several hundred million CFA francs, gifts received from foreign governments or companies that operate in the country.

Since then, Bokassa, who was living a rather isolated life in Berengo, has been trying to take matters into his own hands again and every day has been making the Berengo-Bangui run (80 km) in a small plane, a Corvette, piloted by French youth, his children traveling in other small planes. His chief preoccupation is finding the necessary money to get the tension lowered; even in the country, one does not get over the "bonds" that the banks are refusing to honor. A puff of oxygen came from France in February with a new loan for 1,000,000,000 CFA francs, and also from Kuwait with a credit of about \$3,000,000. This money

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served to fill in the gaps and take care of first things first by paying, in order: 1)the military, 2)policemen and gendarmes, 3)customs officers, 4)other civil servants such as teachers, hospital workers, etc. But something snapped, when demonstrations by students, policemen and soldiers hesitated for a long time before firing on their sons or their cousins' sons, not to mention the sons of the leaders. One of the demonstrations by these students was even led by the son of Henri Maidou, the prime minister. Bokassa did not fail to hold the parents responsible. According to some witnesses, Zairean soldiers were then put in charge of most of the repression while crossing the Oubangui. The river also became the crossing place for a very large traffic in objects stolen from Bangui villas. These especially well-organized thefts are worrying the cooperators who see them as hostile demonstrations against the imperial regime.

Despite all the difficulties, Bokassa still seems to be solid, even if only because he has the benefit of Paris' protection. A French diplomat who knows Bangui well gave us this confidence: "There is no easy alternative formula. For sentimental and humanitarian reasons, we do not want to follow the American methods used when they wanted to rid themselves of Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam. You see what happened then. Closer to home, there is the shah."

Iran played the role of catalyst in this remarkable bloody agitation in Bangui. Students, in the manner of the partisans of Khomeyni, walked for two days, shouting this slogan: "After the shah--Bokassa!" Never did a dispute go so far. For the moment the "fox" Bokassa has broken the force of the coup and he still aspires to be the world's last emperor. It is true that he is sitting on a poor country. But can one speak of poverty when one has uranium and diamonds under his feet?

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CHAD

NEED FOR POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ACCEPTED BY ALL

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Mar 79 pp 67-69

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "What Future for Chad?"]

[Text] Interminable lines of refugees stretch out over several kilometers along the dusty paths, furrowing the region of swamps and bogs south of Nd'jamena that constitutes Chad's granary, with its plantations of cotton, peanuts, millet, dry legumes, sweet potatoes and rice, when irrigation is possible.

But these thousands of Nd'jamene who according to their means have chosen the automobile, the bicycle, the donkey or even walking on foot, have not suddenly discovered the benefits of agriculture. They have quite simply decided to withdraw to the land of their origin, leaving almost deserted the capital which has been living in slow motion for several weeks, and in which their security is no longer assured.

Thus, the Nd'jamena region is no longer the buffer zone that served as a junction between the nomad and Islamized populations of the North and the Christian and sedentarized populations of the South. Practically cut in half, the Chadian capital is completely paralyzed.

Each of the two parties has stayed put while the bargaining goes on for a possible agreement between the different groups. But hostilities have not ceased and the tension remains. Many believe the wisest solution is to pack one's bags and flee. But can the small southern cities support this sudden migratory flow?

It is true that Chad itself is the result of population movements and invasions that enabled non-negroid peoples, chiefly Arabs and Fulahs, to mix with black populations. The result is cross-breeding which is nevertheless rather superficial.

The varying religious currents that permeate the country are responsible in large part for this situation. They have caused Chad to be divided into two human groups of materially equal importance. The Islamized populations on the

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one hand and, on the other, the animist ethnic groups, most of which have embraced the Christian religion transmitted by colonization.

The resistance of the populations of the North to colonial penetration contributed much to the imbalance existing in the country today. It is true that for a long time the people of the North showed a certain repugnance with respect to school. It was in the South, more open to education, that most of the political elite was recruited at the time of Chad's accession to independence on 11 January 1960. General de Gaulle's personal representative, Andre Malraux, could then declare, "Chad's destiny is privileged in comparison with so many African countries, in that it is starting with the new civilization. Here it is not a question of liquidating the past, but of ensuring the future." We wager that the French minister-writer was far from suspecting the difficulties that awaited the new state. It took just a few years to realize that the existence of several communities living in the interior of a geographic territory is not enough to transform that entity into a nation. When in May 1978 JEUNE AFRIQUE used the title "Chad State Being Born" (No 905), the country had been in ruins for a long time. Already, throughout the land, actual division was a reality (see map).

Although the multiplicity and diversity of the players today makes the game especially complex, no one could forget that the causes of the evil proceed precisely from the imbalance existing between the two groups that people Chad. That began in June 1965 at Mangalme, with a banal tax collection affair. The inhabitants of the locality, believing they were being subjected to extortion by civil servants who were natives of the South, refused to discharge their civic duty. What was in the beginning just a Jacquerie [peasant uprising] soon looked like a rebellion, extending to several localities in the region. The opponents of President Tombalbaye's regime were waiting for just that, in order to organize the discontent.

The Chadian National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) was created. Afterwards it experienced diverse fortunes at the mercy of the confrontations between its successive leaders. The Chadian opposition is as divided as the country itself. Its internal quarrels are continuous, and it is in extended order that the various groups are going to present themselves at an eventual round table, considered--with reason--as a last-chance meeting.

As paradoxical as that may appear, it is the government in place--or more precisely one of the components of that government--that is in a position of weakness. In recent months everything has happened as if each protagonist was being careful above all to strengthen his foundations so that he may be in a position of strength when he presents himself at the negotiation. That is how the northern part of the country is in the hands today of the different factions of the FROLINAT; while the head of the gendarmerie, Col Wadaz Abdelkader Kamougue is arguing, with President Felix Malloum, over Prime Minister Hissein Habre's redoubt in the Nd'jamena region, the South is still loyal to the president of the Republic.

But are the players on the field in control of the game? Chad is known to have long been the object of international covetousness.

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Although Nigeria and the Sudan are jostling each other in order to propose their own mediation plans and although the OAU itself has formed a reconciliation committee that is pawing the ground, France and Libya are playing the part of gendarmes firmly determined to impose the "right choice." The idea of a Chadian federation is not a new one for France. It previously took five years after independence for an important region of Chad, the BET (Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti) to come under Chadian administration. Until 1965, in fact, the BET for strategic reasons continued to belong to France. Gen de Gaulle's government wanted the region to serve as a refuge for Algerian-born Frenchmen coming from Algeria. Afterwards, he unsuccessfully asked President Tombalbaye to make available to him the region of Haraze Mangueigne, to serve as a training base for mercenaries favorable to the secession of the South Sudan.

Col Qadhdhafi, for his part, gave priority to the extension of Islamic space and influence. An eventual Islamic state in the North could be one of the components of the "Chadian federation."

That possibility as envisaged by Tripoli would not have met with Goukouni Oueddei's approval. That attitude would be behind his quarrel with the Libyan leader and would also have precipitated a new explosion in what remained of the FROLINAT. The group that seems to be favored by Libya is led by Muhammad Acyl. Despite a certain influence exercised by Paris and Tripoli, no Chadian politician is really in favor of the federal system. Gen Malloum perhaps lacked clarity and vigor in stating only that he would not take the initiative. But Hisssein Habre downright rejected that formula. On that point he is in total agreement with his potential enemy, Col Kamougue, as well as with other leaders, including Dr Abba Siddick, a former FROLINAT leader, who is waiting to make his real re-entry into politics around the negotiating table.

The federal system having been rejected outright, everyone is in agreement on the necessity for an administrative and political reform. This requires a new regional carving up and a decentralization providing for a certain margin of autonomy at the local decision level. A consensus will have to be swiftly arrived at on this subject.

There will remain the thorny problem of division of responsibility. It is far from being solved and yet that is what will determine the future of the institutions. The open war that Felix Malloum and Hisssein Habre have been waging has shown that it was impossible for them to govern together. Will one of the two protagonists agree to efface himself on behalf of the national interest, or will it really be necessary again to resort to the judgment of arms? In any case, the fundamental charter signed in August 1978 flew to pieces with the recent events. A new experiment--one more--is going to be attempted. What form it will take is not yet known.

Drawing a conclusion from the bloody week that Chad went through in February, a cadre from the South, disillusioned, said to me, not without bitterness, "Up to now the leadership in these matters has been exercised by a national from the South. We are trying an experiment with a man from the North. We

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shall see what comes out of that." Today that sentiment, which expresses a certain laziness, is shared more and more by Chadian cadres.

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GABON

ANNOUNCEMENT OF REFERENDUM BRINGS MIXED REACTION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Mar 79 pp 73-74

[Article by Sory Serinde Diallo: "Neither Referendum Nor Reshuffling"]

[Text] Surprise and disappointment--these were the feelings that many Gabonese experienced when, on 20 February 1979, President El Hadj Omar Bongo announced to them that he was calling off the referendum on constitutional reform and that there would not be any ministerial reshuffling before 1980.

The second special congress of the PDG [Gabonese Democratic Party] held in January 1979 in Libreville had decided that upon the end of the term of the existing legislative the deputies would be elected for 5 years (instead of 7 years) separately from the Gabonese president whose tenure has been kept at 7 years. This decision was to be approved by referendum. It will now be passed by the central committee and political bureau of the PDG and by the National Assembly.

The head of state justified this procedure by the need not to be committed to new expenditures in this period of austerity. Any voting costs money for transportation and the printing of ballots, not to mention the mobilization of the activists to the detriment of their occupational activities. The same concern to save public funds within the framework of the austerity plan has prompted Gabon to renounce the celebration of its independence anniversary in Port Gentil this year. A saving of 30 billion CFA francs will result.

A referendum makes it possible for the governors to subject their policies to a plebiscite. It is rare when they are voted down. To renounce a referendum for the sake of saving money under these conditions redounds completely to the credit of the Gabonese head of state. The taxpayer will not complain of it.

But surprise and disappointment stem more from the postponement of changes in the government. They have been pushed back to 1980, following the presidential election. President Bongo has in a way wanted to save a cabinet reshuffle. The latter had been assumed to be imminent on the morrow of the

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PDG congress. It was all the more expected as those meetings were the occasion for the formulation of harsh criticism of the administration of public affairs by numerous participants. One of the most virulent criticisms came from the head of state himself. Tribalism, nepotism, professional incompetence, leadership crisis, the holding of several offices by some, diversion of public funds, corruption, and demagoguery among others were unanimously denounced with particular virulence. It seemed to go without saying that heads would roll in very short order. Some cadres furthermore were anxious to replace the possibly outgoing ones. They did not hide their disappointment at the postponement.

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GABON

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS APPROVES PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Mar 79 p 699

[Text] Meeting with President Bongo on 7 March, the Gabonese Council of Ministers approved a bill concerning modifications to be made in the constitution following the second special congress of the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) held in Libreville from 24 to 27 January (see MARCHES TROPICAUX of 2 February 1979, p 262, and of 2 March 1979, p 578).

The bill will be submitted to the Central Committee of the party and the National Assembly, meeting in a joint session in April.

The main provisions of the bill, which is to confirm the preponderant role played by the party in the government and specify objectives to be achieved and terms of operation of institutions within the national and international framework, have to do with the party, the office of president and the government, the National Assembly and the High Court of Justice, the AFP notes.

According to the new provisions of the constitution, if the presidency is definitely vacated, the Supreme Court is to be invested jointly by the government, the National Assembly and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party meeting together. Under the current system, the text stipulated the National Assembly of the Central Committee of the party.

New articles give the Central Committee and the Political Bureau the power to take the measures and make the decisions falling within the framework of their respective competencies. If it is a matter of texts of a legislative or regulatory nature, they are carried out by the president of the republic by an order or a public administration regulation.

The term of the presidency remains unchanged: 7 years. As decided at the last congress, the term of deputy is reduced from 7 to 5 years. Elections will henceforth take place from a list in each province.

In order to take the new provisions of the constitution into account, the Council of Ministers has decided to postpone until 1980, on a date later to be set by decree, the elections scheduled for the selection of the council

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members from the local collectives. Likewise, it approved a bill setting 25 February 1980 as the date on which the current term of deputies will expire. In addition, the members of the High Court of Justice are to be elected by the Central Committee of the PDG from among its members. They were previously elected by the National Assembly from among the deputies.

Finally, in keeping with the resolutions of the second special congress, President Bongo has decided that the members of the government and high officials named by decree cannot simultaneously hold more than two posts of board chairman of industrial, agricultural or commercial companies.

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GABON

PORT FACILITIES, ESTIMATED COSTS REVIEWED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Mar 79 pp 16-17

[Article: "Beginning Today, Ports of Tomorrow"]

[Excerpts] Libreville-Owendo

For a long time Gabon's capital had by way of a port only one pier located close to Libreville's downtown section and able to receive only vessels with shallow drafts. It was necessary to build a deep-water port. Owendo was selected, 15 kilometers southeast of Libreville, because the natural channel at this point is 11 meters deep.

In 1977 Libreville-Owendo traffic rose from 800,000 tons to 1.3 million tons (of which 1.2 million tons represented imports) because of the preparations for the OAU summit conference held in Libreville in July of that year. At this time the volume of cargo handled is in the order of 1 million tons, a level which causes concern that the saturation point for the port complex will be reached in the near future. It is planned that by 1983 the terrepleins and hangars will be expanded, that two new pier stations (with an 11-meter draft) will be built as will 400 meters of pier with shallow draft. The estimated cost of the projects is 25 billion CFA francs.

The New Owendo Lumber Port

With the opening in December 1978 of the first section of the Trans-Gabonese Railroad it is anticipated that beginning in 1980 Owendo will receive 1.5 million tons of floated lumber annually and 250,000 tons of heavy lumber. To accomodate this traffic it was indispensable to lay out a large lumber port. Located east of the tip of Owendo, this port will be inaugurated on 10 March 1979. The work (12 billion CFA francs) bore on the laying out of 15 hectares of terrepleins for heavy lumber, 600 meters of piers in pile-plank and 1,500 meters of protective dikes delimiting an enclosed log floating area of 40 hectares.

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Santa Clara and Mayumba

In connection with the Trans-Gabonese Railroad which will make possible the outshipment of manganese from Moanda and, by around 1990, of iron from Belinga, there are plans to build at the cape of Santa Clara (15 km northeast of Libreville) an ore terminal capable of handling at least 16 million tons a year and accomodating very large vessels with drafts exceeding 13 meters. Until now southwestern Gabon has had only the Congolese port of Pointe Noire as a maritime outlet. It is also planned to lay out a deep-water commercial port near the entrance of the M'Banio lagoon at Mayumba which for the moment specializes in lumber traffic.

The project would involve the following: 800 meters of protective breakwater, a pier-docking station with a 10-meter draft, 2 hectares of terrepleins, and an enclosed log floating area of 4.5 hectares for lumber. The estimated cost is 7 billion CFA francs.

The construction of this port will be complemented by that of the Ndende-Tchibanga road. Additionally, a regional improvement program envisions the laying out of agricultural and forestry farms, the opening of the Milingui iron mine, and of gypsum and marble quarries.

Port Gentil

In August 1979 the deep-water port of Port Gentil will be completed. Its cost totals 13 billion CFA francs. Its major features are as follows: 680 meters of pier (of which 400 meters with an 11-meter draft), 6,000 square meters of warehouses, 110 hectares of industrial parks where an ammoniac plant and industrial fishing plants will be built. In 1977 traffic (including oil at Cape Lopez) totaled 12,664,719 tons.

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GUINEA

ADMINISTRATIVE, FINANCIAL REFORMS STREAMLINE ECONOMY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Mar 79 p 690

[Text] A series of reforms is now being applied in order to ensure more effective management of the Guinean economy, in keeping with decisions made by the Congress of the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) held in November, notes the AFP, which makes a summary of them.

As a result, the structure of IMPORTEX [presumably Import-Export Company], the largest national commercial firm in Guinea, is going to be completely changed. This measure was just approved by Guinea's Council on Standards and Accounting, Radio Conakry reports. The Council followed a reform proposal presented by President Sekou Toure aimed at making IMPORTEX more functional. All of Guinea's regular imports and exports go through IMPORTEX. According to provisional figures given by Radio Conakry, IMPORTEX reportedly made a profit in 1978 of 1.74 billion syllis (1 syli = about .22 French francs or 11 CFA francs).

The accounting systems of the different commercial firms in Guinea are also going to be standardized before the second part of the annual National Economic Conference which is to take place in April.

In addition, the Guinean JOURNAL OFFICIEL has published a list of 13 appointments of financial directors of national enterprises. Only three of them are transfers from one company to another. The others are appointments of financial executives who previously held posts in government supervision or the administration. Sekou Toure recently told participants in the first part of the annual National Economic Conference that there would be important changes at the head of national enterprises in order to avoid "favoritism, narrow group interests and indifference to other sectors."

Finally, the JOURNAL OFFICIEL of Guinea notes two presidential orders aimed at improved management of funds. The first provides that wages and salaries owing to employees and officials of the government and public organizations will be paid at the latest on the fifth day of the month following that for which the sum is due. The second stipulates that fines and impound fees previously collected by policemen and gendarmes as part of their duty will henceforth be paid directly to the Treasury and receipts issued.

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MOZAMBIQUE

MOZAMBIQUE FACES RECRUDESCENCE OF ARMED RESISTANCE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Mar 79 pp 39-40

[Article by Francois Soudan: "Crusader of the West"]

[Excerpts] "Attention, it is possible to be black and an enemy of the people!" This red slogan which used to cover the walls of Lourenco Marques (today known as Maputo) during the early agitated hours of Mozambique's independence can now be seen again on the wooden fences of Mozambican cities. On 12 February 1979 the official daily NOTICIAS announced that "300 enemy agents" had been arrested these past few weeks in Tete Province, in the west-central portion of Mozambique.

Espionage and Sabotage

Among them were black children aged 12 to 14 trained in Rhodesia and then sent to Mozambique in small groups on espionage and economic sabotage missions. Unquestionably, this renewed upsurge of the activities of an armed opposition, connected with increasingly deadly and effective raids by the Rhodesian army, represents a specific plan of the Ian Smith administration: To destabilize this strong link in the frontline which Mozambique has become.

The Salisbury authorities are using for this purpose and for more than a year now Mozambican movements hostile to the Mozambique Liberation Front [FRELIMO] of Samora Machel.

The opposition movements, made up of secessionist members of FRELIMO who broke with the ruling party for ideological or ethnic reasons, or former African troops of the Portuguese colonial army, withdrew to Malawi and Rhodesia after Mozambique's independence in 1975. With some Rhodesian "Selou scouts" or European mercenaries as their cadres, they form a single front--Africa Libre (or Free Africa). Mozambican leaders assert that they are financed by the former Portuguese colonist, Jorge Jardim.

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With the aid of the Salisbury authorities, Jorge Jardim has armed and consolidated the movements opposing FRELIMO and established in Malawi, Zambia, and Rhodesia. But this is not his only activity. Traveling constantly between Brazil, South Africa, and Portugal, Jardim is involved very adroitly in politics, business, and literature.

This esthete with the demeanor of Machiavelli, a former boy scout and the father of 12 children, has indeed written two books: "Mozambique, Terra Queimada" [Mozambique, Fiery Land], a work of romanticized memories which, in 1976, was the year's best-seller in Portugal; and especially "Rhodesia: O Escandalo dos Sancoes" [Rhodesia: Scandal of the Sanctions] published in 1978 and which narrates from the inside and in minute detail how "courageous Rhodesia" has been able to elude the oil embargo imposed on it since 1966. It is true that Jorge Jardim, who had substantial interests in the Mozambican oil refineries, was one of the principal actors in this elusion.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

NATIONAL SUGAR INSTITUTE ESTABLISHED--A decree issued by the Mozambican Council of Ministers concerns the establishment of the National Sugar Institute (INA, to use the Portuguese acronym), which will be in charge of directing, planning and coordinating all activities of the sector. The text emphasizes that the sector has priority in the processing industry, not only because it employs nearly 30,000 persons, but also because it plays a great role in the population's food supply and as a source of foreign exchange for the country. The establishment of the INA, which comes directly under the Ministry of Industry and Energy, also responds to the urgent need to guarantee the rehabilitation of the sugar industry by using all the existing capacity and by rationally distributing available human and material resources. The main objective is to increase production, productivity and yield in this branch. The INA will supervise all activities linked to sugar cane growing, the sugar industry and other complementary industries that are totally devoted to this branch and considered essential to the activity. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Mar 79 p 711] 11,464

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UPPER VOLTA

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DELAYS REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Feb 79 pp 37-38

[Article by Francoise Hubscher: "A Certain Deception"]

[Text] Is it because it's the season for warm evenings when the trees still show the beneficial effects of October's rain? Never has Ougadougou received so many visitors so early in the year. Colloquiums, conferences, ministerial visits--five events of this kind could be counted in one week. The Voltan capital seems to be taking on the role of a regional center. The Pan-African Cinema Festival, the CEAO (West African Economic Community), have chosen it as their headquarters and numerous interstate educational institutions have been installed there. Doubtless it is the air of liberty which can be breathed here "our only true wealth" as Voltans love to say, which accounts for the attractiveness of the town.

Proud of this success, the 180,000 inhabitants of Ougadougou are nevertheless worried. The presence of an increasing number of foreigners fosters development of the building and service trades, but also feeds inflated prices (10 to 15 percent annually). And nine months after the new Assembly was seated and General Lamizana re-elected to the presidency of the Republic, the firming up of the economy so much hoped for is still being waited for.

"When I returned from France," a young Voltan reported, "I had to wait six months to find a place to live. A house with running water and electricity which can accommodate seven persons costs between 50,000 and 100,000 CFA francs a month. The monthly salary of a category C government employee is around 30,000 CFA francs per month. Only international agency employees can afford to pay. So they pile into little huts without utilities constructed in undeveloped zones and it is still necessary to pay 6,000 to 8,000 CFA francs for 3 rooms!"

The stands at the central market are well furnished with meat and fresh vegetables. But provisions are not cheap. Millet is 75 CFA francs a kilo, rice is 110 or 125 according to the quality, potatoes are 150. If a family with five children would eat rice only, 2 and 1/2 kilos a day, it would have to spend more than 8,000 CFA francs a month (the minimum monthly salary does not officially go over 12,500 CFA francs).

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In spite of all this, life goes on in the town's wide dusty streets. Bicycles overloaded with cut wood, Japanese motorcycles--Yamaha and women's models of Suzuki are the most popular--wobbly taxis and occasionally a Mercedes or overblown air-conditioned Peugeot circulates more or less happily among the pedestrians. What do they do to get by? They contrive. Go into debt to the point they never see a penny of the end of month paycheck. Cross the border where one pays less. Every Friday evening a cohort of vehicles leaves the city towards the Ghanaiain capital Accra which they will reach the next day.

A Lackadaisical Attitude

But the system D is not all. And salary increases in the public sector given 1 January (6 to 25 percent, while the unions claim 40 percent to catch up) have not succeeded in quieting complaints. Above all, the inefficiency of these "businessmen-clerks" is deplored. President Lamizana himself in his end of the year message denounced "the lackadaisical attitude of certain leaders whose cars by 10 o'clock in the morning are lined up in front of various coffee houses and snack bars in town and who make only episodic appearances at their desks, preferring to spend their time on private business." He added, "We find ourselves faced with a fundamental question, the definition itself of the kind of society we can promote in our country. It will not be an easy task. The economy, essentially based on agriculture, is subject to the fortunes of climate; per capita income is among the lowest in the world; the budget is modest (30,000 million CFA francs in 1978) and the development plan is largely financed by foreign aid. The projects are taking a long time to see daylight. Fifteen are waiting. Some, like Sotexko (Kongoussi Textile Company) have insufficient technical and financial preparation. Others suffer from a lack of enthusiasm on the part of local promoters who prefer short term speculative operations.

Foreign Aid

And if the reopening of Boura's gold mine has started off well, the manganese deposits at Tambao still have not been exploited; the international climate has changed and foreign investors are no longer very interested.

In spite of the dynamism of some agro-food businesses and some success in developing agriculture regions such as the Volta Valley, the Voltan economy has not succeeded in getting under way.

Certainly, the exploitation of phosphate is being counted on. It is hoped that the substrata will be found to bear uranium, as Niger's does. Prospecting is in course. But for much of the young impatient managerial class, the miraculous discovery is not enough. "My country cannot pay for the luxury of a laissez-faire economy," one of them stated. "The government

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should affirm its authority while still respecting the free play of democratic principles. It was hoped there would be changed after the elections and the seating of the new Assembly. Nothing happened."

So, we continue to wait.

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